Scroll Top
CEAS: “Breaches of core legal principles are going to become the new normal”

CEAS: “Breaches of core legal principles are going to become the new normal”

The European Union wants to tighten its rules for asylum procedures once again and the countries at the borders will keep the main responsibilities. Minos Mouzourakis, legal and advocacy Officer at Refugee Support Aegean (RSA), in his interview to the German organization PRO ASYL, explains the Greek discourse and the consequences expected from the reform of the “Common European Asylum System” (CEAS).

If you cannot activate the subtitles, open the video on YouTube

Could you describe the actual situation in Greece? We talk about Greece as a kind of blueprint for European plans regarding border procedures.

Greece is bound by the same rules that apply to Germany and other countries. Roughly speaking, what we’ve had over the past several years is a series of severe violations of the right to asylum through successive reforms and bad practices, especially after the EU-Turkey deal. Regrettably, the legacy of those bad policies is what has led to an attempt at codifying them in EU legislation for years to come. So breaches of core legal principles are going to become the new normal, not only for Greece but for the entire EU.

And when the new plans are established, for example regarding the “fiction of non-entry”, what will change in Greece with CEAS?

The result of this reform will be a regression of standards across borders and a dismantling of protection for Greece.

This also brings about a number of changes, including the so-called “non-entry fiction” applicable at border areas and on the islands, which would mean that people are legally considered not to be on Greek soil. This is something that Germany is all too familiar with through its airport procedure, from which we know that the only way to make this happen as a legal fiction is through mass deprivation of liberty.

If this were to happen on the Greek islands, that would fundamentally change the situation of an already difficult environment into a completely explosive one.

You mentioned that the possibilities to apply for asylum could change in Greece, especially on the islands. How is it at the moment?

These are some changes in the CEAS reforms that are more obscure and definitely less debated. One of the key changes that the Council has proposed is limitations on ways to access the asylum system by “making” a claim, by expressing the intention to obtain protection from the EU. At the moment, it’s quite clear from international law and from the case law of the EU Court that this is subject to no restrictions or formalities.

A person can utter the words “I need protection” or demonstrate they need protection and gain asylum seeker status until their claim is actually heard. What Member States want to do is to narrow down, to restrict the possibility of making a claim for protection, to be done only in person and only before designated authorities. This would mean in a future scenario that if somebody crosses the land border and approaches a Greek army official and tells them they need protection, this would not count as a claim for protection. It would not protect the people from deportation, from arbitrary arrest and detention, and all sorts of other very negative consequences for their fundamental rights.

Regarding the so-called “safe third countries”, Greece may be a blueprint as well, as Greece declared Turkey a “safe third country”. What is your experience with this issue?

The “safe third country” concept has been one of the core elements of the Greek asylum system backsliding from 2016 to present. We’ve had an arbitrary and systematic dismissal of now tens of thousands of asylum claims without any assessment of whether people need protection, based on the sole assumption that Turkey would be a country in which they can seek protection. Without this being supported by evidence. So what the CEAS reform does is take this extremely negative, extremely damaging precedent and convert it into EU legislation through a multidimensional expansion of the safe third country concept. According to the view that is put forward by Member States, the EU will be able to designate safe countries at EU level, at national level, or even to use the concept without a national or EU list.

In practice, it will be possible to designate countries as “safe third countries”, even if they persecute their own citizens. So they’re themselves refugee-producing countries. It would be possible to designate them as “safe third countries”, even if they don’t give refugees any form of legal status, so long as they somehow allow them to remain on their territory.

And the EU would be able to presume safety on the basis of a sole agreement with a country that provides assurances that it will treat people fairly and according to standards. In practical terms, this would make the safe country concept readily available not only for Greece but for many other member states who wish to deflect their protection responsibilities.

Could you give some practical examples of what could happen then?

Looking at practical examples that are not too remote and not too far from our experience, Greece designates Turkey as a “safe third country”, even though Turkey has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention. It does not abide by international refugee law standards, and there are well-documented, reputable, authoritative reports pointing to systemic deficiencies and flouting of international norms, systematically forcing Syrian refugees back to Syria or Afghans back to Afghanistan.

The position that is usually put forward by the Greek authorities is that their Turkish counterpart, through letters to the EU, assured that people would be treated in line with standards, and then all the evidence on how people are actually treated on the ground is completely disregarded.

That could open the door for countries that not only don’t abide by the Refugee Convention but also do not give any form of documents to refugees. Iran could be a viable example for Afghan refugees, many of whom live there without, however, having any legal status or recognition by the state.

What could be the consequences of the changes in Dublin, with the longer deadlines for Greece? Because maybe deportations from Germany will get more frequent then.

I think one of the key areas that demonstrate that this reform is constantly and severely misrepresented is indeed the maintenance of the Dublin rules. We had heard in 2020 that the Dublin system had failed, that it was dead and would be replaced by a new approach. Only to end up with an extremely complex and convoluted regulation that keeps all the key features of Dublin intact.

Member States of first entry, such as Greece, have heavier responsibilities. For example, the ever- present criteria for responsibility based on irregular entries are not only maintained but strengthened. The time period for which a country would be responsible under the current rules is one year. Under the new rules it will be two years. It would be easier for countries like Germany and others to send people back to countries like Greece, even if the receiving country has not accepted the transfer. And transfer deadlines are much larger, much more extended for countries like Germany. This would not only lead to more returns to unsafe countries, it would also contribute to perpetual limbo for people stuck in a member state without actual access to an asylum procedure. There are similar very heavy restrictions and dismantling of protection for people who are recognized in a different member state, a reality that is all too apparent in Germany, dealing with several tens of thousands of refugees who have previously got protection in Greece.

A country like Germany would be able to dismiss asylum claims by these people without even interviewing them. This would lead to a direct rejection and then an order to return back to the first country, even though, as the German courts have stated, Greece does not guarantee humane treatment for these people upon their return.

The EU is discussing the so-called “instrumentalization regulation” and wants to include it in CEAS. What could happen?

The “instrumentalization” piece is visibly inspired by the Greek experience. It is an idea that is constantly put forward in Greek discourse. It will be used as a basis for dismantling standards, denying people access to protection.

With the current tension between Greece and Turkey, we could imagine a scenario where every single arrival from Turkey could be construed as an attempt to “instrumentalize”, thereby triggering an entire set of derogation from the rules.

And how would all the new regulations change your capacity to help refugees?

The effects that we expect from the reform are overwhelmingly negative. If this reform passes, access to people who need legal support will be much more difficult, especially if they are massively placed in closed, inaccessible, and obscure detention settings. And the rules that we have to fight against will become extremely complex and unworkable.

Minos Mouzourakis is Legal & Advocacy Officer at Refugee Support Aegean (RSA). RSA was founded in 2017 and implementing partner of PRO ASYL in Greece. It staff comprises of lawyers, social workers/scientists, researchers, media workers, and interpreters with extensive and lengthy experience on refugee protection in Greece.

Related Posts

Subscribe to our Newsletter

* απαιτούμενο
Language

Intuit Mailchimp

Thank you for subscribing!